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Abstract
We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting
￿rms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a
tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their ￿rm, however, governments are
unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand, the cost of abatement and the damage caused from
pollution. Under these modes of uncertainty we derive su¢ cient conditions under which the governments
optimally choose an emissions tax over an emissions standard.
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During the last three decades developed countries have recognized the need for regulating pol-
luting agents, since they incur harmful and irreversible damage on human health and on the
environment (see Stern, 2007). As a result national and international environmental agencies,
such as EPA, founded in 1970, and EEA, founded in 1995, oversee and ensure the e¢ cient and
e⁄ective regulation of pollution.
In general, there are two ways to regulate industrial pollution: (a) through the use of
quantity constraints, which translate into several forms of maximum emission standards or
pollution permits; and (b) through emission taxes. A voluminous literature referred to as
￿strategic environmental policy literature￿demonstrates how environmental policy instruments
can be used as second best instruments for international trade purposes when traditional trade
taxes, subsidies and quotas are prohibited or restricted due to international trade agreements.
Speci￿cally, in the context of international oligopolistic competition, among others, Conrad
(1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996a), Ulph and Valentini
(2001) and Neary (2006) conclude that when ￿rms compete in outputs governments, in an
e⁄ort to enhance the international competitiveness of their exporting ￿rms, have a unilateral
incentive to pursue laxer environmental policy, i.e., use of lax emission standards or emission
taxes.1
Another strand of the literature compares the welfare and pollution implications for open
economies of the di⁄erent environmental policy instruments, i.e., emissions standards vis-￿-vis
emissions taxes. For example, Ulph (1996b) in an imperfectly competitive trade model where
two countries produce a single polluting commodity and ￿rms are allowed to strategically invest
in capital, demonstrates that, ￿rst, the use of emissions standards over taxes need not be a
dominant strategy, and second the choice of the environmental policy instrument has an impact
on producers￿strategic (investment) behavior, output, pollution, and thus welfare.2 Recently,
Lahiri and Ono (2007) extend the above results by comparing the e⁄ects of an emissions tax and
1Empirical support concerning ecological dumping can be found in Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Edering-
ton and Minier (2003), Ederington et al. (2005) and Levinson and Taylor (2008).
2Ulph (1996b), assumes that governments select their policy instruments in a way satisfying international
agreements. Hence, governments cannot select their policies strategically. An emissions tax (standard) leads
to higher welfare over a standard (tax) if a country is a signi￿cant consumer (producer) of the polluting good.
Moreover, emissions standards relative to taxes or to no environmental policy reduce a country￿ s strategic incentive
for overinvestment.
2of a relative emissions standard on the levels of pollution and welfare. They conclude, among
other things, that with a ￿xed number of ￿rms a relative emissions standard is welfare-superior
to an emissions equivalent emissions tax, while an emissions tax is emissions-superior to a welfare
equivalent relative emissions standard. The authors, however, do not consider asymmetric cases
where each country implements a di⁄erent policy instrument, and thus do not obtain a full payo⁄
matrix and do not attain Nash equilibria of the game. Yanase (2007) examines the welfare and
pollution e⁄ects of emissions standards and taxes in a dynamic game model of international
competition with many countries, cross-border pollution which accumulates over time, and
governments which either all choose the same or di⁄erent from each other policy instrument.
He concludes that in a non-cooperative policy game, standards are favored over taxes since the
latter entail larger strategic distortions, e.g., terms of trade, abatement costs and environmental
damage e⁄ects, relative to emission taxes, thus resulting to higher pollution and lower welfare.
From the above reviewed literature it can be argued that, by and large, in the context of
open economies and imperfect competition emissions standards relative to taxes lead to lower
levels of pollution and higher welfare, since they leave ￿rms with less ￿ exibility, thus weakening
the prisoner￿ s dilemma amongst competing governments (countries).
A notable feature, among others, of the strategic environmental policy literature reviewed
above is that of complete information for all agents, i.e., ￿rms and governments. Here we
develop a model of an international duopoly, where we assume that exporting ￿rms are better
informed than their respective national governments in regards to demand conditions, or cost of
abatement or ￿nally in terms of environmental damage caused by production of their polluting
output. The modeling and methodology of the present paper synthesizes various analytical
features of the above reviewed literature as well as features of the literature on strategic trade
policy under imperfect competition. This synthesis, despite its practical and real world relevance
has not been attempted to date. Speci￿cally, we use a model of an international duopoly a-la
Barrett (1994), while the invoked modes of uncertainty in demand, abatement cost and pollution
damage functions follow along the lines of closed economy models of environmental policy, e.g.,
Weitzman (1974). The modes of strategic environmental policy we consider are equivalent to
those of strategic trade policy with imperfectly competitive markets and uncertainty in the
seminal paper by Cooper and Reizman (1989), henceforth C-R￿ 89. In C-R￿ 89, the sole source
3of uncertainty is the structure of demand, and governments choose strategically between trade
quotas and trade subsidies in order to shift pro￿ts in favor of their exporting ￿rms. Here, trade
quotas and subsidies are replaced by emissions standards and emissions taxes, which we rank in
terms of their expected welfare e⁄ects, when governments strategically choose these instruments
in order not only to shift pro￿ts in favor of their exporting ￿rms but also to regulate pollution.3
Our ￿ndings verify that in the context of imperfect competition and complete information
emissions standards are welfare superior to emissions taxes. Furthermore, we argue that under
certainty, using standards not only leads to welfare superior outcomes, but it also constitutes a
dominant strategy for each regulator and thus a Nash equilibrium strategy for each government.
Nonetheless, we also claim that uncertainty should play a key role in the decision of the optimal
policy instrument. In particular we introduce uncertainty either in the demand intercept, or in
the intercepts of the marginal abatement cost and marginal damage functions. Then we provide
su¢ cient conditions under which it is optimal for the regulator to select an emissions tax to
regulate pollution, in contrast to the aforementioned literature.
Our result is in line with several empirical studies. Few of them presented by Harrington et
al. (2004), illustrate that di⁄erent countries frequently face identical environmental problems
through the use of di⁄erent policy instruments. In particular, they provide twelve case studies
on six environmental problems and they illustrate that the US and several EU countries apply
di⁄erent policy instruments in each case. As illustrated in Howe (1994), the United States has
employed quantitative restrictions of emissions while EU countries preferred to control pollution
through a tax. Additionally, many industries in Japan opposed the implementation of a carbon
tax, yet there are increasing numbers of ￿rms willing to conform with quantity constraints. This
paper may help understand any possible preferences of standards over taxes and vice versa.
2 The Model
We consider a model of a symmetric international duopoly, where each ￿rm is located in a
di⁄erent country (home and foreign) and produces an identical and homogenous good consumed
3Nannerup (1998) introduced uncertainty about ￿rms￿costs in a strategic environmental policy model with
a similar structure to ours. However, in contrast to our model, Nannerup allows the implementation of both
standards and lump sum taxes, simultaneously, and thus the construction of a truth revealing contract is possible.
Furthermore, Nannerup does not examine the choice of an optimal policy instrument which is the aim of this
paper.
4in a third country, e.g., rest of the world (ROW). Consumer preferences in ROW can be mapped
into a quasi-linear utility function which yields an a¢ ne linear inverse demand, p = B￿x￿X+￿,
where B is the demand intercept, x and X are the output levels for the domestic and the foreign
￿rm, respectively, and ￿ is a random variable re￿ ecting positive or negative additive demand
shocks. This random variable is assumed to follow a distribution with mean zero.4
Both ￿rms have the same production technology, and for simplicity a unit of production
generates a unit of a purely local pollutant (z). Further for simplicity we assume that an
exogenous end-of-the-pipe abatement technology (a) exists for the ￿rm and thus net pollution
equals production minus abatement carried out by the ￿rm,
z = x ￿ a: (1)




ga2 + au; (2)
where g is a positive scalar, which determines the cost of pollution control and u is an error
term following a distribution with zero mean. The introduction of the stochastic term u can be
interpreted as a shock occurring in the abatement cost function, re￿ ecting our assumption that
governments, contrary to ￿rms, are less informed about the exact position of ca.5 The pro￿t
function of the domestic ￿rm depends on the policy instrument chosen by the government in
order to regulate pollution and it is given by the following expression:
￿ = (B ￿ x ￿ X + ￿)x ￿ cx ￿ ca ￿ tz; (3)
where c is the marginal cost of production (common for both ￿rms) which exhibits constant
returns to scale, and tz are the tax payments due to pollution when a tax is the policy instrument
4Throughout the paper the foreign country￿ s variables and functions are indicated with upper case letters.
Due to assumed symmetry, the comparative statics analysisis is carried out primarily in terms of home country
variables. The variables of the foreign country are equivalently derived. Furthermore, we assume that when ￿
takes negative values, interior solutions for our variables are still obtained. This could be described by an ￿
2
distribution or a truncated normal distribution with zero mean.
5The form of the stochastic term (u) leads to parallel shifts of the marginal cost of the abatement function.
For simplicity, we assume that the intercept of the marginal function equals to zero. This assumption appears




2 + g1a + au + g3, where gi > 0, i = 1;2;3.
5in use.6 When the government implements an emissions standard, then tz = 0. The choice
variables of the ￿rms are output and the level of abatement.
Regulation of pollution by the governments takes place prior to production decisions. We
examine two di⁄erent ways of regulating pollution. First, we assume that governments can use
an emissions standard, i.e., a quantity constraint setting the maximum allowed level of total
emissions for the ￿rms. Additional emissions must be abated by the ￿rm. In this case the choice
variable for the ￿rm is the level of output. Production generated emissions must coincide with
the standard (z) set by the government.7 The alternative policy instrument available to the
governments is a tax (t) for each unit of emissions. In this case, the choice variables for the
￿rm are the level of output and pollution abatement. Governments in the two countries in both
regimes choose the optimal level of regulation by maximizing social welfare given by:
w = ￿ + tz ￿ d; (4)




kz2 + z￿; (5)
where the coe¢ cient k is positive and determines the injuriousness of the pollutant. Similarly
to the abatement cost function, we assume that the damage function is stochastic and depends
on a random variable, ￿, which also follows a distribution where its expected value equals zero.8
Throughout the paper we assume that uncertainty in the abatement cost and damage functions
are uncorrelated.
6The results are not a⁄ected qualitatively if we allow for decreasing returns to scale. Note also that in order
to calculate total marginal cost of production both in the cases of standards and taxes we need to take into
account how changes in output a⁄ect the cost abatement and the tax expenditures respectively. Algebraically,
total marginal cost of production in the case of taxes is tmct = c+t, while the corresponding one for the case of
standards is tmcs =
￿
c; for x ￿ z
c + g(x ￿ z); for x > z
.
7Note that standards and pollution permits are equivalent policy instruments only in the case where the latter
are non-tradable. However, in our case tradable permits cannot be introduced since the pollutant is assumed to
be local and thus there is no reason for the governments to accept licences of a ￿rm located in a di⁄erent country.
8It is more realistic to assume that ￿ is unobservable by both the governments and the ￿rms, as there is no
reason to assume that the ￿rms are better informed about the damages caused from pollution to the society.
However, in order to have a unique informational structure in the model and remain consistent with the timing
of revelation of the other modes of uncertainty we assume that, contrary to the governments, ￿ is revealed to
the ￿rms. This does not a⁄ect the results, since uncertainty in the damage cost function appears to play no role
in the decisions of the ￿rms. ￿ is also introduced in such a way that a shock results in a parallel shift of the
marginal damage function.
6The time structure of the model follows that of C-R￿ 89 and it is based on the assumption
that governments in general are less informed about ￿rms￿demand and cost functions, than
the ￿rms are. Initially the governments choose between emission standards and taxes in order
to regulate pollution. Given this, the governments choose the actual policy levels. Following
the governments￿actions, uncertainty (about the demand intercept or the marginal cost of
abatement and the marginal damage) is revealed to the ￿rms. Hence, when ￿rms compete in
outputs we assume that they act in an environment with complete information.
3 Optimal Policy Instrument with Demand Uncertainty
In this section we assume that governments are uncertain only about the ￿rms￿demand con-
ditions, i.e., ￿ 6= 0; u = 0 and ￿ = 0. In order to determine which policy instrument is chosen
we derive the Nash equilibrium of the game taking into account all the possible choices of both
governments. In other words, we derive the full payo⁄ matrix of expected welfare levels for
every possible contingency, i.e., when the domestic and the foreign governments implement the
same or di⁄erent policy instruments.
3.1 Both Governments Implement Emission Standards
In order to derive the Bayes Nash equilibrium for this case we solve the problem via backwards
induction. Hence, our solution starts from the ￿nal stage of the game, where ￿rms compete in
outputs given that both governments choose emission standards to regulate pollution. Recall
that, when standards are used as instruments, the only control variable left to ￿rms is produc-
tion, while abatement can only take the value that satis￿es equation (1). Bearing this in mind,




s:t: a = x ￿ z
() x =




@X = ￿ 1
2+g < 0 is the slope of the domestic ￿rm￿ s reaction function. We observe from
the reaction function given in (6) that output adjusts positively when a positive demand shock
7occurs, yet this adjustment is proportionally lower than the shock per se. Solving simultaneously
the domestic and the respective foreign ￿rms￿reaction functions, we obtain equilibrium outputs
as a function, among other things, of domestic and foreign emission standards:
x =
(B ￿ c + ￿)(1 + g) + g(2 + g)z ￿ gZ
(1 + g)(3 + g)
: (7)
From equation (7) and the respective foreign equilibrium output we obtain that dx
dz > 0, dX
dZ > 0,
dx
dZ < 0 and dX
dz < 0. The last two derivatives imply that when regulation abroad is relaxed,
local output falls due to the negative slope of the reaction function (6). This derivative is the
core of the so called "strategic environmental policy" literature, since it creates incentives for
the governments to relax regulation in order to favor, i.e., shift pro￿ts, the exporting ￿rms.
Since governments do not know the exact position of demand, given equilibrium outputs
in both countries, they select the optimal level of emission standards by maximizing expected
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= 0
() z =
g(2 + g)2 [(B ￿ c)(1 + g) ￿ gZ]
￿1
; (8)
where ￿1 = g f9 + 2g [8 + g(5 + g)]g+(1+g)2(3+g)2k. Equation (8) gives the reaction function
of the domestic regulator. That is, @z
@Z < 0 implies that domestic and foreign emission standards
are strategic substitutes (see Bulow et al., 1985). If the foreign regulator tightens its standard
then the domestic laxes its own and the reverse. Strategic substitutability of standards follows
when the standard is tighter in one country, thus, production in that country falls, which in
turn increase the production of the rival ￿rm through the output reaction function in (6). As
8a result, the ￿rm in that country faces a higher marginal cost of abatement and the regulator
a tighter strategic incentive which amplify the direct and strategic e⁄ects respectively, and in
turn force the rival regulator to relax further the standard.
Solving simultaneously (7), the domestic government￿ s reaction function (8) and the corre-















where m = g[9 + g(11 + 3g)] + (1 + g)(3 + g)2k. These are the equilibrium levels of outputs
chosen by the ￿rms and emission standards chosen by the governments. Abatement can be
calculated through equation (1). Since the standard is set by the government it does not
depend on ￿, while output is volatile since the demand is stochastic. However, equilibrium
outputs increase (decrease) less in absolute terms when a positive (negative) shock occurs in
the demand intercept, than the change per se. Moreover, the strategic e⁄ect is positive and
creates an incentive to relax regulation (increase z) compared to the case where it is equal to
zero, which describes the ￿rst best scenario where regulation is set such that marginal cost of
abatement and marginal damage are equalized, i.e., @￿
@z = @d
@z, and thus the externality is fully
internalized. In order to determine the level of expected welfare in the case of standards we
substitute equilibrium values given in (9) and the implied abatement level in (1), into (4). After
taking expectations and some algebraic manipulation we get:9
Ew￿
zZ =





CR bene￿t for standards
; (10)
where the subscripts denote that a standard is used in both countries and var(￿) is the mean-
preserving spread distribution (variance) of the demand intercept.
The second right hand side term of (10) indicates that expected welfare depends positively
on var(￿), i.e., ex ante welfare increases with uncertainty. Two opposing e⁄ects determine
this outcome. The positive e⁄ect is due to the convexity of the pro￿t function in terms of the
demand intercept and it is similar to the ones introduced by C-R￿ 89 and Creane and Miyagiwa￿ s
9All the calculations in the paper are carried out using Mathematica 6.
9(2008) strategic trade models. Another interpretation of this result is that since ￿rms are better
informed about ￿, expected pro￿ts, thus expected welfare depend positively on var(￿), as the
damage from pollution is not a⁄ected by the demand variability because pollution is ￿xed at
the selected level. The negative e⁄ect, absent from the strategic trade models, is attributed to
the convexity of the abatement cost function, which implies that high var(￿) entails a negative
impact on expected pro￿ts and thus welfare. Nonetheless, the positive e⁄ect is stronger than
the negative one and thus the overall e⁄ect is positive. We denote the overall outcome as "CR"
bene￿t due to the similarity with the one introduced in C-R￿ 89 and, thus, expected welfare
depends positively on var(￿) as illustrated in equation (10).
3.2 Both Governments Implement Emission Taxes
We now assume that both governments impose taxes to control pollution. Now ￿rms have two
available control variables, output and the abatement level. Solving backwards we derive the
￿rst order conditions for the domestic ￿rm:
d￿
dx
= 0 () x =









The output reaction function of the domestic ￿rm is given in equation (11). As in the case
of standards, laxer environmental policy, i.e., lower tax, shifts the output reaction function
outwards. This drives the ￿rm to increase its output. Moreover, we observe that when taxes
are used, the output reaction function becomes steeper than the corresponding one in the case of
standards, and results to a more aggressive behavior in output rivalry. The pro￿t maximizing
condition with respect to abatement is given by equation (12) and states that the marginal
cost of abatement equals the pollution tax. The equilibrium values of outputs as a function of
taxes and the parameters of the model are obtained by solving the domestic and foreign ￿rms￿
reaction functions simultaneously:
x =
B ￿ c + ￿ ￿ 2t + T
3
: (13)
10From equation (13) and the respective foreign equilibrium output we obtain that dx
dt < 0, dX
dT < 0,
dx
dT > 0 and dX
dt > 0. The strategic e⁄ect, similarly to the case of standards, is founded in the
last two partial derivatives, which imply that when an emissions tax abroad is lowered, local
output falls due to the negative slope of the reaction function (11).
Next we examine the domestic government￿ s decision for the optimal tax. Governments

































g[3k + g(￿1 + 2k)](B ￿ c + T)
￿2
; (14)
where ￿2 = g(9+4g)+(3+2g)2k. Equation (14) gives the home government￿ s reaction function
in the case of emission taxes. If 3k +g(￿1+2k) > 0 taxes are strategic complements, which as
we will see later, is a necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution in equilibrium,
i.e., non-negativity of taxes. For example, when the domestic government lowers its tax, the
domestic ￿rm increases its output. This leads to lower foreign output through the reaction
function and therefore the foreign tax is also reduced, implying the strategic complementarity
of taxes. The main implication of strategic complementarity is that a potential rivalry in tax
competition would cause a vicious cycle of relaxing taxes (i.e., a race to the bottom), which
would inevitably harm both the environment and ￿rms pro￿ts since ￿rms produce too much
output. On the other hand, if 3k + g(￿1 + 2k) < 0, taxes are strategic substitutes and results
to a negative pollution tax (a pollution subsidy). This is infeasible as it implies a negative level
of abatement (see equation (12)). For obvious reasons, this possibility is omitted from the rest
of the analysis.
In order to obtain the equilibrium levels of outputs, taxes, and pollution in the two countries
we solve simultaneously equations (1), (12), (13) and (14) and the corresponding equations for
the foreign ￿rm and government, to obtain:
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; (15)
11where n = g(9 + 5g) + (3 + g)(3 + 2g)k and abatement in equilibrium is implied by (12), i.e.,
a￿ = t￿
g . As already mentioned, k >
g
3+2g is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence
of an interior solution. Comparing the solutions (15) and (9) several inferences can be drawn
that play a signi￿cant role in determining the expected national welfare levels. When emission
taxes are implemented instead of standards, the greater slopes of output reaction functions and
the strategic complementarity of taxes, lead to higher output and pollution in equilibrium.
Furthermore, in contrast to the case of emission standards, when taxes are implemented,
pollution is stochastic since pollution depends on production, which is random due to involved
demand uncertainty and more sensitive to demand variability. This is so as, the total marginal
cost of production runs steeper when a standard is used, in contrast to the case of a tax where
the marginal cost is horizontal (see footnote 6). Hence, ￿rms are more ￿ exible in the case of























The total marginal cost of production when a tax is the policy instrument, is obtained through
equation (3) and equals c + t, which is represented in Figure 1 by the horizontal line TMCt.
The total marginal cost of production when a pollution quota is the chosen policy instrument,
is obtained again from (3) and is represented by the kinked line cAB. The kink at point
12A denotes that from this point onwards the standard becomes binding. We initially assume
that the equilibrium is at point E, where the total marginal cost of output, when a standard
or a tax is used, are equal and intersect the marginal revenue (MRx). Two possible shocks
are represented in the demand intercept (one negative and one positive, which shift marginal
revenue from MRx to MR1
x and MR2
x, respectively) and four new equilibria are obtained (E1
t
and E2
t for taxes, and E1
s and E2
s for standards). From this we observe that the equilibrium
output becomes less responsive to demand variability when a standard is implemented rather
than a pollution tax.
Substituting the new equilibrium levels from (15) and abatement obtained from (12) into
(4) and taking expectations, we obtain the expected welfare for each country:
Ew￿
tT =
















In contrast to the case of standards, expected welfare is a negative function of var(￿) when
k > 2. Nonetheless, if k < 2, expected welfare depends positively on the variance of the
demand intercept. This re￿ ects the fact that pollution is now stochastic as it is determined
by the di⁄erence of production minus abatement carried out in equilibrium. Subsequently, the
higher the variance of the demand function is, the more stochastic is pollution and has a negative
e⁄ect on welfare. However, as in the previous case, expected pro￿ts depend positively on var(￿)
due to the existence of the CR bene￿t. In particular, the CR bene￿t is magni￿ed because ￿rms
have greater ￿ exibility in output competition (see Figure 1) and abatement is deterministic
which implies that abatement cost is constant. The overall e⁄ect of var(￿) on expected welfare
is ambiguous. If the damage caused from the pollutant is severe enough (k > 2) then the
negative e⁄ect implied by the variability in the damage function is greater than the CR bene￿t.
Expected welfare falls as uncertainty rises, while the opposite holds when the pollutant is less
harmful.
133.3 The Asymmetric Case
We turn now to the case where one government uses a standard and the rival imposes a tax.
We only solve for the case where, in order to regulate pollution and shift rents towards the own
exporting ￿rm, the domestic government implements an emissions standard and the foreign uses
an emissions tax. The reverse problem is equivalent since the model is symmetric.
The problem is again solved by backwards induction. At the ￿nal stage ￿rms maximize
pro￿ts. Because of the di⁄erent choice of the policy instruments, the domestic ￿rm maximizes
pro￿ts with respect to output, while the foreign with respect to output and abatement. The
reaction function of the output of the domestic ￿rm is given by equation (6), while the ￿rst
order conditions for the foreign ￿rm are given by (11) and (12) respectively. Solving these si-
multaneously, we attain the equilibrium levels of outputs as a function of the domestic emissions
standard and the foreign pollution tax:
x =
B ￿ c + ￿ + 2gz + T
3 + 2g
and X =
(B ￿ c + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ (2 + g)T ￿ gz
3 + 2g
: (17)
From (17) we observe that when the domestic government relaxes its standard then domestic
output rises, while the foreign one falls. The reverse holds when the foreign government reduces
its own tax. Hence, even in the case that both governments select di⁄erent policy instruments
the incentive to relax environmental policy for rent shifting purposes is still present and only
the magnitudes are a⁄ected.
In light of (17), and given the assumed demand uncertainty, both regulators select the
optimal level of their policy instrument by maximizing expected welfare with respect to the
corresponding instrument.10 So, the domestic and foreign reaction functions are as follows:
z =
(B ￿ c + T)2g(2 + g)
￿2
and T =
g[￿g + (1 + g)(3 + g)k][(B ￿ c)(1 + g) ￿ gz]
￿1
: (18)
The domestic government￿ s reaction function is positively sloped, since a decrease in the foreign
tax lowers the domestic output. In turn, marginal cost of abatement and the strategic incentive
are lowered and drive the regulator to tighten the standard. The foreign regulator￿ s reaction
function must be negatively sloped, since a decrease in the domestic standard increases foreign
10We follow a process equivalent to (8) and (14) for the home and the foreign country respectively.
14output which requires a higher tax.11
Solving equations (17) and (18) together with the corresponding ones of (1) and (12) for the
foreign ￿rm, we obtain the Bayes Nash equilibrium levels of outputs, the domestic and foreign
pollution and the foreign tax:
8
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; (19)
where
q = g2(3 + 2g)[9 + 2g(4 + g)] + g f54 + gf132 + g[120 + g(48 + 7g)]ggk
+(1 + g)2(3 + g)2(3 + 2g)k2;
￿3 = g[3 + g(g + 3)] + (1 + g)2(3 + g)k and ￿4 = g(g + 3) + (1 + g)(3 + 2g)k:
Following a similar reasoning to the one of the previous subsection we can understand why
domestic output is less sensitive to unanticipated shifts in demand (see Figure 1). Using the
equilibrium values given in (19) we are ready to calculate domestic and foreign expected welfare






















(B ￿ c)2(g + k)(2 + g)￿2
4￿1
q2 ￿
(1 + g)2(k ￿ 2)
(3 + 2g)2 var(￿)
￿
: (21)
From (21) we infer that in the country where a tax is levied to regulate pollution, its expected
welfare, i.e., EW￿
zT = Ew￿
tZ, depends either positively or negatively on var(￿). As in the
previous section this depends on how injurious the pollutant is to the citizens of this country.
11Hence, the foreign tax and the domestic standard must be strategic substitutes (i.e. ￿g+(1+g)(3+g)k > 0),
otherwise, as we will see right after, an interior solution for the foreign emission tax in equilibrium is not possible.
It can be veri￿ed that the stability of the system is satis￿ed by the slopes of the reaction functions given in (18).
15In the country where an emissions standard is chosen, its expected welfare depends positively
on var(￿) because the CR bene￿t is still present. This occurs regardless of the choice of the
policy instrument in the rival country.
3.4 Form of Intervention
Having derived the expected welfare levels for all the possible policy combinations, we now turn
to the Nash equilibrium choice of a country￿ s policy instrument. Before doing so we provide the
optimal response of the domestic regulator for each possible policy instrument chosen by the
rival. Lemma 1 summarizes these results:12
Lemma 1:
a)When var(￿)! 0, i.e., near certainty, choosing an emissions standard dominates in terms
of welfare the choice of an emissions tax, regardless of the other country￿ s choice of policy
instrument.
b) When var(￿) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses an emissions standard,
then choosing a tax is optimal iff
g
(1+g)(3+g) < k <
gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2(3+g)2 .
c) When var(￿) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses an emissions tax, then
choosing a tax is optimal iff
g
(3+2g) < k <
g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2 .
d) When var(￿) is su¢ ciently high and
g
(3+2g) < k <
g(3+2g)
(3+g)2 , then both countries choosing a
tax welfare dominates to both choosing a standard.
Proof in Appendix (A)￿
Using Lemma 1, we de￿ne the Nash equilibrium both for the cases of certainty and uncer-
tainty in the following proposition:
Proposition 1:
a) When var(￿)! 0, the Nash equilibrium suggests that both countries regulate pollution
through emission standards.
b) When var(￿) is su¢ ciently high and
g
(3+2g) < k <
gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2(3+g)2 , then in the Nash
equilibrium both countries choose an emissions tax as a policy instrument.
12Because of the invoked symmetry in the model, the Nash equilibrium policy choices of the foreign given
home￿ s policy choices are identical to those in Lemma 1.
16c) When var(￿) is su¢ ciently high and
g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2 > k >
gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2(3+g)2 , then we obtain
two symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies where both countries select either a standard or
a tax, and one in mixed strategies where each regulator selects a standard or a tax with positive
probabilities.
d) If k >
g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2 , then both countries choose emission standards to deal with pollution
problems regardless of var(￿). Finally, when k ￿ 2 , choosing standards is always an equilibrium
strategy independently of the value of g.
Proof in Appendix (A)￿
The results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows. First, as noted
in the reviewed literature, e.g., Lahiri and Ono (2007), Ulph (1992, 1996b) and Yanase (2007),
and as stated in parts (a) of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, in the absence of uncertainty or when
uncertainty converges to zero the Nash equilibrium choice of emissions standards over emission
taxes by all rival countries leads to welfare superior outcomes. However, as stated in the
remaining parts of the aforementioned lemma and proposition, at Nash equilibrium, this result
may be reversed when uncertainty, here in terms of demand conditions, exists. In particular,
when uncertainty is high and k is relatively low (lower than the critical values), then superior
welfare outcomes emerge when both countries choose emission taxes to regulate pollution. The
presence of demand uncertainty, given certain parameter values, it provides Nash equilibria in
a choice game where governments not only may select di⁄erent policy instruments, but also the
use of emission taxes may be welfare superior to that of emission standards.





(which imply the use of taxes in equilibrium) with respect to g are increasing. Moreover, the
derivative of the ￿rst critical value is greater than that of the second, and it results to a greater
range of values of k that can support the use of pollution taxes in equilibrium, as g increases.
This is attributed to the fact that, for high values of g, when a standard is used as a policy
instrument, output becomes less sensitive to any possible demand shocks, since the marginal
cost of abatement and thus the marginal cost of production become steeper. As a result, the
CR bene￿ts, attributed to the ￿rms and the high variability in demand, are now lower. This
does not occur when a tax is chosen, as the marginal cost of production is independent of g.
The CR bene￿ts attributed to the ￿rm due to the use of a tax, remain unchanged irrespective
17of the level of g. Moreover, the losses caused from the variability of pollution in the damage
function are now lower, since a greater g implies a steeper marginal abatement cost and thus
a lower variability in pollution. Putting these results together, intuitively we understand that
taxes become more attractive as a policy instrument when g is higher. Unless, the injuriousness
of the pollutant is extremely high (i.e., k ￿ 2), emission taxes may emerge as an equilibrium
strategy.
We now turn to the analysis of the mixed strategies in part (c) of Proposition 1. Could
they be interpreted beyond the usual exercise of "￿ ipping a coin over strategies"? One possible
explanation is that a mixed strategy can be seen as a pure strategy in both instruments, that
is, the regulator imposes both a standard and a tax. In line with this, the probability fraction
might indicate the percentages of standards and taxes to be imposed, of the respective optimal
levels of standards and taxes, when these instruments are imposed separately. However, this
issue deserves a more detailed analysis which lies out of the scope of this paper.
The welfare implications of Proposition 1 are signi￿cant, since it notes cases where the ex-
porting countries can be better o⁄ in terms of their expected welfare by choosing taxes over
emission standards. Hence, a Pareto superior outcome can be achieved in terms of expected
national welfare for the two exporting countries. Nonetheless, one might wonder what happens
with expected welfare in ROW and more importantly what happens in expected global welfare,
which is equal to the sum of the expected welfare values in each country. Concerning ROW￿ s
expected welfare it follows intuitively that taxes lead to a superior outcome since they imply
greater production by the exporting ￿rms and thus a lower price, increasing consumers￿sur-
plus.13 When uncertainty is very high, the implementation of taxes leads to higher expected
welfare in every country and consequently to an increase of expected global welfare. If uncer-
tainty is rather low and the two exporting countries select standards, then expected welfare is
lower in ROW and therefore the e⁄ect on expected global welfare becomes ambiguous.
In terms of pollution it can be shown that the common scenario suggests that emission
standards lead to lower pollution in comparison to taxes, unless a signi￿cant negative shock
a⁄ects the demand (see Appendix (A)). However, this does not a⁄ect the third country￿ s welfare
since the pollutant is assumed to be local.
13For an excellent survey see Ulph (1997).
184 Uncertainty in the Cost of Abatement and Damage
We now consider the case of certainty in demand conditions, but of uncertainty in the cost of
pollution abatement and damage caused from pollution, as introduced by the stochastic terms
in equations (2) and (5). Moreover, recall that the stochastic terms (u) and (￿) are assumed
uncorrelated. The analysis and results of this section are compared to earlier studies such as,
Weitzman (1974), Fishelson (1976), Adar and Gri¢ n (1976), Stavins (1996) and Baldursson
and von der Fehr (2004), who introduce uncertainty in the cost of abatement and pollution
damage functions, and examine the welfare and pollution e⁄ects of choosing emission standards
over emission taxes and vice versa, in the context of a closed economy. Here, maintaining the
quadratic functional structure used in the aforementioned studies, we extend the analysis to
the context of an international duopoly where, ￿rst, each country￿ s choice of an environmental
control instrument is a⁄ected by the choice of instrument made by the other country. Second, the
choice of instrument not only serves as means of controlling pollution, but also as a strategic
policy choice for shifting pro￿ts in favor of the local exporting industry. Neither of these
features pertinent to an international duopoly is present to a closed economy set up used in
the aforementioned studies. Note that for simplicity we allow uncertainty to a⁄ect only the
intercepts of the functions and not the slopes, e.g., as in Weitzman (1974). This demands a
more elaborated analysis and the results become rather tedious. Nonetheless, we expect that
the driving forces of our analysis should still be present in a "Weitzman" setting as well.
Once again, we analyze each possible sub-case separately, in order to determine the equilib-
rium levels of the endogenous variables and expected welfare levels. The computations follow
the same steps as the ones given in section 3 and thus the equilibrium values of the choice vari-
ables and expected welfare levels for every contingency are given in Appendix (B). Despite the
fact that the mode of uncertainty is now di⁄erent, since we assume uncertainty in the abatement
cost and damage functions, the mechanism implied shares many similarities with the one given
in the case of demand uncertainty.
As it can be seen from equation (B1) given in Appendix (B), which represents expected
welfare in each country when both governments select an emissions standard, expected welfare
depends positively on the variability of the marginal cost of abatement (var(u)). This, again,
re￿ ects the fact that the ￿rms are better informed than the governments. We shall call this
19"modi￿ed CR" bene￿t. This bene￿t stems from the form of the abatement cost function. Each
￿rm, after observing the actual value of u, adapts abatement through output decisions creating
a positive component in the expected welfare level. As in the case of standards with demand
uncertainty, a negative e⁄ect appears with uncertainty. Now expected revenues are lowered as
var(u) magni￿es. Since the positive e⁄ect outweighs the negative one, expected welfare depends
positively on var(u).
The same holds when a tax is the policy instrument chosen. The presence of uncertainty
implies higher expected welfare attributed to the modi￿ed CR bene￿t. Compared to the case
of standards this bene￿t is now higher because ￿rms have two choice variables. One is output
and the other is abatement. Hence, the ￿rms use their abatement decisions in order to conform
with the actual level of abatement cost, while output decisions remain una⁄ected. This implies
that the implementation of taxes creates only a positive e⁄ect in terms of expected pro￿ts.
However, a negative e⁄ect on expected welfare also appears, since pollution is stochastic and
thus damage from pollution is stochastic as well. Which of the two e⁄ects prevails, depends
on the scalars g and k that determine the slopes of marginal cost of abatement and marginal
damage, respectively. In particular, as it can be observed from equation (B3) when k > g, i.e.,
the marginal damage is steeper than the marginal cost of abatement, the negative e⁄ect o⁄sets
the positive one, the expected welfare level depends negatively on var(u), and vice-versa.
Another implication of our results is that the uncertainty about the damage function (var(￿))
does not appear in the expected welfare levels; hence we do not expect that it will a⁄ect the
selection of the policy instrument. This result is in line with Weitzman (1974), Fishelson (1976)
and Adar and Gri¢ n (1976). The explanation is that uncertainty in the damage function does
not a⁄ect ￿rms￿decisions in the ￿nal stage of the game. However, as Stavins (1996) points out,
this is true only in the case where the stochastic variables are uncorrelated.
The following lemma provides the necessary conditions, given the expected welfare levels for
every sub-case in Appendix (B), for the determination of the new Nash equilibria in the policy
instrument choice game:
Lemma 2:
a) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses a standard, choosing a tax
is optimal iff
g
(1+g)(3+g) < k <
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 .
20b) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and the rival country chooses a tax, choosing a tax is
optimal iff
g
(3+2g) < k <
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2.
c) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high, then both countries choosing standards, welfare domi-
nates to choosing taxes iff k >
g(9+4g)
(3+g)2 .
Proof in Appendix (B)￿
From Lemma 2 we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2:
a) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and
g
(3+2g) < k <
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2, then in the Nash equilibrium
both countries choose emission taxes as a policy instrument.
b) When var(u) is su¢ ciently high and
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2 < k <
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 , then we obtain
two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies where one government selects a tax and the
rival one chooses an emissions standard, and one in mixed strategies where each country selects
a policy instrument assigning positive probabilities.
c) If k >
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 then both governments in equilibrium choose an emissions
standard to deal with pollution problems regardless of var(u). Finally, when k ￿ 2 , choosing
standards is always an equilibrium strategy independently of the value of g.
Proof in Appendix (B)￿
Proposition 2 establishes the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for taxes to constitute a
Nash equilibrium strategy.14 Similarly to the previous case, we observe that taxes constitute
an equilibrium strategy only when the marginal damage cost coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently low in
absolute terms. However, a general policy rule can be proposed following the implications of
Proposition 2: When the marginal damage is steeper than the marginal cost of abatement, i.e.,
k > g, then a standard yields a superior outcome in terms of expected welfare, compared to a
tax. This appears because the critical value,
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 , is lower than g. This result
is similar to the one derived by Weitzman (1974) and other papers in the relevant literature,
for the case of a regulator who is uncertain about the intercepts of abatement cost and damage
functions.
14Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 do not include the ￿rst part of the corresponding previous ones since the main
result remains una⁄ected. When uncertainty is very low or close to zero, standards yield higher welfare regardless
of the strategy of the rival.
21Despite this, the reverse is not always true. When the marginal cost of abatement runs
steeper than marginal damage, then several conditions must hold to favor a tax. As suggested by
Proposition 2, k must lie below the critical value (
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2) which is lower than g. This condition,
renders taxes a superior policy instrument compared to a standard. Even in this scenario taxes
do not always guarantee superior expected welfare outcomes as the outcome depends on the
level of var(u). As suggested in part (c) of Proposition 2, when k takes values above a speci￿c
critical value (
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 ) then standards yield greater expected bene￿ts compared to
taxes, regardless of the level of var(u). Similarly to the case of demand uncertainty, when k ￿ 2
a tax always leads to a superior outcome in terms of expected welfare.
As in the previous section, although the results seem rather cumbersome, the driving forces in
the model are rather simple. Under uncertainty, when g is relatively high and k is relatively low,
then a tax is superior in terms of welfare than a standard. In terms of Weitzman￿ s modeling it
can be said that the results hold in this case with a slight bias in favor of taxes when uncertainty
is su¢ ciently high. This is in line with the implications of Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004),
although their results are based on the fact that the decisions of some agents are irreversible. In
contrast to that, our bias towards taxes is attributed to the fact that the use of taxes postulates
greater ￿ exibility to the ￿rms, in contrast to the use of standards. When k is relatively high,
then the cost associated with the use of taxes rises because pollution volatility is very costly
to the citizens. If g is low, modi￿ed CR bene￿ts increase when both taxes and standards are
implemented. Yet, even in such a scenario the implementation of taxes is very unlikely because
in most of the cases k will be relatively higher.
Another important implication resulting from Proposition 2 is that uncertainty about the
damage function does not a⁄ect the choice of the policy instrument. This occurs because the
decisions of ￿rms in ￿nal stage remain una⁄ected from any potential shocks in the damage
function. It is important to note here that this result is sensitive to the assumption that
uncertainties in the marginal cost of abatement and the marginal damage are uncorrelated.
According to Stavins (1996) this does not hold when this assumption is retracted. Following
Stavins￿rationale we should expect that when uncertainties are positively correlated, the use
of standards should become more likely. If uncertainties are negatively correlated then taxes
should be more favorable.
22To wrap up and provide comprehensive results from the analysis in this section we provide
the following proposition:
Proposition 3:
When governments are uncertain about the intercepts of the marginal cost of abatement and
damage functions, and uncertainties are uncorrelated then:
a) k > g is a su¢ cient condition such that a standard is superior to a tax,
b) k < g is a necessary condition such that a tax is superior to a standard, and
c) uncertainty in marginal damage does not a⁄ect the ranking of the policy instruments.
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to de￿ne the optimal choice of the environmental policy instrument
in an international duopoly model, where governments use their policies not only to deal with
pollution but to shift rents towards their own ￿rms in an uncertain environment. The calcula-
tions needed in order to obtain the results are complex, but the obtained results are of general
validity.
In particular, we illustrated that when the regulators have full information, then standards
should be preferred to taxes in equilibrium in both countries. In other words, with no uncer-
tainty standards constitute a Nash equilibrium strategy in the policy instrument choice game.
This result is stronger than the result suggested by Lahiri and Ono (2007), Ulph (1996b) and
Yanase (2007). However, in very uncertain environments taxes can break down the superiority
of standards, when the slope of marginal damage is relatively low. This is true only when
uncertainty is su¢ ciently high, which implies that the level of uncertainty matters.
Several concerns about the model may be expressed. For instance, the reader might wonder
how our results are a⁄ected when we allow for transboundary pollution. Undoubtedly, climate
change is a great challenge facing our economies today. As moderate estimates predict (Stern,
2007), if no immediate action takes place, future damages in GDP will range from 5% ￿ 20%
per year. Therefore, policy makers should design and implement CO2 emissions regulation. In
such a case our results are a⁄ected quantitatively but not qualitatively. Since foreign pollution
is added to the local one, the damage caused from pollution to the society when one unit of
pollution is emitted is now higher. This enforces the governments to tighten regulation regardless
23of the policy instrument used. In the sub-case where both governments implement a tax, the
negative e⁄ect from the variability in pollution is now higher. This makes taxes less favorable
for a greater range of values of k. So, taxes are less likely to be used when the pollutant is
global.
Another objection to our model might be the absence of consumption of the exporting good
in the two exporting countries, which might a⁄ect the derived welfare implications. Quirion
(2004), Heuson (2008a, 2008b) and Hoel (1998) re-examine using closed economy models, Weitz-
man￿ s question of "prices versus quantities" in second best environments. The authors claim
that in such an environment taxes admit a greater advantage over standards. Hence, in our
model we expect that the introduction of consumption in the two exporting countries, the im-
position of a positive cost in public funds and the existence of unemployment will create an
extra bias towards taxes.
Nonetheless, our proposals should be used with care in policy implementation as our model
neglects the possibility of using other environmental policy instruments, such as mixed systems
that could possibly lead to higher welfare levels. Moreover, our model does not take into account
possible asymmetries between domestic and foreign functions, and only allows for risk neutral
policy makers. These provide stimulus for future research.
Appendix (A)
Proof of Lemma 1:
a) De￿ne ￿1 = 0:5g3(B ￿ c)2(2 + g)2(g + k)2￿1, ￿2 = 0:5g3(B ￿ c)2(2 + g)2(g + k)2￿2 and
￿3 = fg2(3+2g)[9+2g(4+g)]+gf54+gf132+g[120+g(48+7g)]ggk+(1+g)2(3+g)2(3+2g)k2g2.








g2f54 + 7g[12 + g(6 + g)]g
+gf108 + gf264 + g[238 + g(95 + 14g)]ggk
+2(1 + g)2(3 + g)2(3 + 2g)k2
￿3
> 0: (A1)








g2f54 + g[84 + g(46 + 9g)]g
+g(3 + 2g)f36 + g[64 + g(38 + 7g)]gk
+2(1 + g)2(3 + g)2(3 + 2g)k2
￿3
> 0: (A2)
Using equations (A1) and (A2) we observe that when var(￿)! 0 standards are a dominant
strategy Q.E.D.








￿gf15 + 2g[12 + g(6 + g)]g
+(1 + g)2(3 + g)2k
2(3 + g)2(3 + 2g)2 var(￿): (A3)









￿gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g+(1+g)2(3+g)2k then (A3) has a
negative sign. Finally, we need to add the necessary condition for the existence of an interior
solution which is k >
g
(1+g)(3+g) Q.E.D.








￿g(15 + 8g) + (3 + 2g)2k
18(3 + 2g)2 var(￿): (A4)
For a tax to be preferred to a standard when the rival chooses a tax, the right hand side of (A4)






￿g(15+8g)+(3+2g)2k then (A4) has a
negative sign. Finally, we need to add the necessary condition for the existence of an interior
solution which is k >
g
3+2g Q.E.D.








￿g(3 + 2g) + (3 + g)2k
18(3 + g)2 var(￿); (A5)
and limvar(￿)!0(Ew￿
zZ ￿ Ew￿
tT) > 0. For expected welfare when taxes are implemented (by
both regulators), to be superior to the corresponding one when standards are used (by both







￿g(3+2g)+(3+g)2k then (A5) has a negative sign. Additionally we need to insert
the necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution which is k >
g
3+2g Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
a) From part a) of Lemma 1 we get that when var(￿)! 0 standards are a dominant strategy
for both governments. Hence, when var(￿)! 0 the unique Nash equilibrium is the one where
both governments select standards Q.E.D.






(1+g)2(3+g)2(3+2g)2 > 0. If we compare the lower limits of the







We further assume that the restrictions given for var(￿) satisfy both inequalities given in b) and
c) of the previous lemma. Given b) and c) from Lemma 1, when
g
(3+2g) < k <
gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2(3+g)2 ,
choosing taxes for the domestic government will be a dominant strategy. Since the model is
symmetric the same holds for the foreign regulator. This su¢ ces for choosing emission taxes as
policy instruments at the Nash equilibrium Q.E.D.







(3+2g)2 > k >
gf15+2g[12+g(6+g)]g
(1+g)2(3+g)2 , the results
and the restrictions for var(￿) given in b) and c) of Lemma 1, we observe that when the foreign
government selects a standard then it is optimal for the domestic government to pool to the
same strategy (i.e., Ew￿
zZ > Ew￿
tZ). If the foreign regulator chooses a tax then the domestic
government selects a tax as well (i.e., Ew￿
zT < Ew￿
tT). Hence, the equilibrium strategy of each
regulator is conditional to the strategy of the rival. Given these we obtain two symmetric Nash
equilibria in pure strategies where both governments select either standards or taxes. Since we
have two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies it is directly implied that a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies exists. In this equilibrium each government selects its policy instrument with a
positive probability. This probability is derived as the weighted value of expected welfare when
a standard is used, and equals the corresponding one when a tax is implemented. The weights
are the probabilities assigned in the strategies of the rival regulator Q.E.D.
d) If k >
g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2 , then using b) and c) from Lemma 1 we obtain that choosing standards is
a dominant strategy and hence the unique Nash equilibrium involves both governments using
26standards, irrespective of var(￿).
If we di⁄erentiate the threshold level for k,
g(15+8g)








(3+2g)3. This implies that the threshold level is continuously increasing in the level of g. If we
take the limit of the threshold level as g tends to in￿nity we obtain limg!1
g(15+8g)
(3+2g)2 = 2 Q.E.D.
Proof of Superiority of Standards in Terms of Pollution:
In order to provide a comparison of standards and taxes in terms of pollution we need to










From (A6) we observe that pollution is greater in equilibrium when taxes are used instead of
standards unless a signi￿cant negative shock occurs in demand Q.E.D.
Appendix (B)
Solutions and Expected Welfare Levels with Uncertainty in the Cost of Abatement and in
the Pollution Damage:
Emission Standards: Following a similar procedure as in section 3.1, it is easy to obtain
the Bayes Nash equilibrium which coincides with the one given in (9) after setting ￿ = ￿u .
Substituting the equilibrium levels of outputs and standards into the welfare function (4) and
taking expectations, we obtain the expected value of domestic welfare. The level of expected




Emission Taxes: Following a similar procedure as in section 3.2 we obtain the Bayes Nash
equilibrium: 8
> > > > <













t￿￿ = T￿￿￿ = t￿ = T￿
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
; (B2)
where the parenthesis attached to the equilibrium variables of section 3.2 indicate that they are
evaluated at ￿ = 0. Substituting the values given in (B2) into the welfare function given in (4)






Asymmetric Case: Following a similar procedure as in section 3.3, it is easy to obtain the




















Substituting the equilibrium levels given in (B4) into the welfare function given in (4), as well as
the corresponding one for the foreign country, and taking the expectations, we attain expected
welfare levels in the home and foreign countries for the case where the domestic regulator picks











fg[9 + 2g(7 + 2g)] ￿ 9(1 + g)2kg
2g2(3 + 2g)2 var(u): (B6)
Proof of Lemma 2:








3f￿gf27 + 2g[27 + g(16 + 3g)]g
+3(1 + g)2(3 + g)2kg
2g2(3 + g)2(3 + 2g)2 var(u): (B7)









3f￿gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g+3(1+g)2(3+g)2kg this is true.












￿g(9 + 4g) + (3 + 2g)2k
2g2(3 + 2g)2 var(u): (B8)
28If Ew￿￿
zT ￿Ew￿￿
tT < 0 then a tax is preferred to a standard when the rival chooses a tax. In case
that k <
g(9+4g)




￿g(9+4g)+(3+2g)2k then (B8) has a negative sign.












￿g(9 + 4g) + (3 + g)2k
2g2(3 + g)2 var(u): (B9)
It can be shown that limvar(￿)!0(Ew￿
zZ ￿ Ew￿
tT) > 0. In case that k <
g(9+4g)





￿g(9+4g)+(3+g)2k then (B9) has a negative sign. Additionally we




Proof of Proposition 2:






3(1+g)2(3+g)2(3+2g)2 > 0. We further assume that the
restrictions given about var(u) satisfy both inequalities given in a) and b) of the Lemma 2.
Given these, when
g
(3+2g) < k <
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2, choosing taxes for the domestic government will be a
dominant strategy. Since the model is symmetric the same holds for the foreign regulator as
well. This is su¢ cient in order to achieve emission taxes as a Nash equilibrium Q.E.D.







3(1+g)2(3+g)2 > k >
g(9+4g)
(3+2g)2, the restrictions for var(u)
and the results given in a) and b) of Lemma 2, we observe that when the foreign government
selects a standard, then it is optimal for the domestic government to separate its own strategy
(i.e., Ew￿￿
zZ < Ew￿￿
tZ). If the foreign regulator chooses a tax then the domestic government selects
a standard (i.e., Ew￿￿
zT > Ew￿￿
tT). Hence, the equilibrium strategy of each regulator is conditional
to the strategy of the rival. Given these, we obtain two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. It follows directly that we attain a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where each
government selects its policy instrument with a positive probability. This probability is derived
as the weighted value of expected welfare, when a standard is used equals the corresponding
one when a tax is implemented. The weights are the probabilities assigned in the strategies of
the rival regulator Q.E.D.
29c) If k >
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 then using a) and b) from Lemma 2 we obtain that choos-
ing standards is a dominant strategy and hence the unique Nash equilibrium involves both
governments using standards irrespective of var(u).
If we di⁄erentiate the threshold level of k,
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g








3(1+g)3(3+g)3 . This implies that the threshold level is con-
tinuously increasing in the level of g. If we take the limit of the threshold level as g tends to
in￿nity we obtain limg!1
gf27+2g[27+g(16+3g)]g
3(1+g)2(3+g)2 = 2 Q.E.D.
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